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UTAH v. STRIEFF: THE GRATUITOUS EXPANSION
OF THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE
COURTNEY WATKINS
In Utah v. Strieff,1 the United States Supreme Court assessed whether
the prohibition on admitting evidence found through an illegal stop dissipates
if the officer makes the stop, finds an outstanding warrant for the person’s
arrest, and then discovers incriminating evidence.2 The Court held that the
evidence seized by the officer following the unlawful stop was admissible
because the discovery of the outstanding warrant “attenuated the connection”
between the seizure and the police misconduct.3 In reaching its judgment,
however, the Court incorrectly equated its “intervening circumstances” analysis to that prescribed under the independent source doctrine,4 ignoring the
requirement that the intervening circumstance must be unforeseeable.5 Furthermore, the Court erred in concluding that the officer’s actions were merely
negligent, and not “purposeful or flagrant.”6 This conclusion drastically
broadens the attenuation doctrine and ignores the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule: the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.7 The Court should
have weighed the “intervening circumstances” factor and the “purpose and
flagrancy” factor in favor of the Respondent, Mr. Strieff, and affirmed the
lower court’s decision to suppress the incriminating evidence.
I. THE CASE
In December of 2006, a caller left an anonymous tip reporting “narcotics
activity” at a home in Salt Lake City, Utah.8 In response, Officer Douglas
Fackrell conducted “intermittent surveillance” of the house over the course
© 2017 Courtney Watkins.

J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
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1. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
2. Id. at 2059.
3. Id.
4. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
5. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.A.1.
6. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063; see also infra Part IV.B.
7. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also infra Part IV.B.
8. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056 (2016).
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of a week,9 during which he observed “short term traffic” frequent enough to
raise his suspicion.10 During Officer Fackrell’s surveillance, he saw Edward
Strieff leave the home and walk towards a convenience store.11 Officer
Fackrell approached Mr. Strieff, ordered him to stop in the parking lot, and
requested his identification.12 Mr. Strieff complied.13 Officer Fackrell then
called dispatch to run Mr. Strieff’s identification and was informed of “a
small traffic warrant” for Mr. Strieff.14
Upon learning of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding warrant, Officer Fackrell arrested Mr. Strieff and searched his person, finding drug paraphernalia and a
plastic baggie filled with methamphetamine.15 Mr. Strieff was consequently
charged for these possessions.16 At trial, Mr. Strieff moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the search, arguing that it was the “fruit of an unlawful
investigatory stop.”17 While the State conceded that Officer Fackrell did not
have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Strieff and, therefore, the stop was illegal, it argued that the exclusionary rule did not bar the evidence seized because the attenuation exception applied.18 The district court agreed with the
State’s argument and denied Mr. Strieff’s motion to suppress.19 The court
found that Officer Fackrell had initiated the stop for investigatory purposes,
and although he lacked the reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Strieff, the stop
was not a blatant violation of the Forth Amendment, but rather a “good faith
mistake.”20 The court then weighed all of the factors and found that suppression was not a suitable remedy, as the search was conducted after Officer
Fackrell discovered a warrant for Mr. Strieff’s arrest, “an intervening circumstance” that he “did not cause and could not have anticipated.”21 Upon the
district court’s denial of Mr. Strieff’s motion, he entered a conditional guilty
plea but reserved the right to take an appeal to challenge the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress and reconsider.22 The Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court, agreeing that Officer Fackrell’s
discovery of the outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance that
9. Id. Officer Fackrell conducted irregular surveillance of the residence over the course of
one week, which amounted to around three hours of surveillance in total. Id.
10. Id. Officer Fackrell observed visitors entering the house and then leaving within a couple
of minutes. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 536–37; see also infra Part II.B.4.
19. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 537.
20. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.3.
21. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 537.
22. Id.
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removed the taint from the evidence that was subsequently found on Mr.
Strieff’s person.23 Additionally, the court noted that Officer Fackrell’s actions were not a purposeful attack on Mr. Strieff’s Fourth Amendment
rights.24
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, the high court did not determine that the facts of Strieff were insufficient to meet the requirements of the
attenuation doctrine, but rather, that the facts of Strieff did not implicate the
attenuation doctrine at all.25 The court reasoned that the attenuation doctrine
is limited to cases “involving a defendant’s independent acts of free will,”26
recognizing that the Supreme Court traditionally applied the doctrine in cases
where a defendant has freely given a statement or consented to a search following an unconstitutional search or seizure.27 The court then applied the
three-factor attenuation test first set out in Brown v. Illinois,28 the results of
which explained why the attenuation doctrine was not implicated by the discovery of an arrest warrant.29 That test considers: (1) “the presence of ‘intervening circumstances,’” (2) “the ‘temporal proximity’ of the unlawful detention and the discovery of incriminating evidence,” and (3) the “‘purpose and
flagrancy’ of the official misconduct.”30 The court first focused on the intervening circumstances factor, explaining that an intervening circumstance
must be “sufficiently distinguishable” from the initial illegality.31 The court
also noted that an intervening circumstance must be an unforeseeable and
independent event in order to cut off the causal connection between the unlawful act and subsequent discovery.32 The court asserted that the discovery
of an arrest warrant could never be an intervening circumstance, as “[i]t is

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 544.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 545. The court relied on Supreme Court cases that involved a defendant giving a
confession after “an initial unlawful arrest.” Id. at 544; see, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,
633 (2003) (suppressing the defendant’s murder confession after the State failed to allege “‘any
meaningful intervening event’ between the illegal arrest and [the defendant’s] confession” (quoting
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982))); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975)
(finding that the defendant’s statement, made less than two hours after the illegal arrest, lacked an
intervening circumstance that would trigger the attenuation doctrine); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (finding that the confession given by the defendant several days after his
unlawful arraignment was not fruit of the poisonous tree, as the connection between the arrest and
the defendant’s confession had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” (first quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); then quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690
n.4 (Utah 1990)).
28. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
29. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 544–45.
30. Id. at 541 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)).
31. Id. at 544 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006)).
32. Id. at 544–45.
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part of the natural, ordinary course of events arising out of an arrest or detention.”33
The court then turned to the temporal proximity factor, remarking that,
usually, “an extended time lapse” supports a finding of attenuation.34 The
court asserted that applying the temporal proximity factor to a case involving
the discovery of a warrant, however, “turn[s] the inquiry on its head,” as it
would incentivize the government to exchange one constitutional right for
another.35 The court explained that a significant time lapse between the initial
unlawful detention and the warrant check would weigh in favor of the government in an attenuation doctrine analysis.36 This time lapse, however,
would be in direct conflict with the government’s constitutional duty to avoid
“unreasonable delay associated with an individual’s detention by the government.”37 The court found that the temporal proximity factor could only apply
in cases where there was an independent act perpetuated by the defendant,
separate from the initial police misconduct, not in an instance where the officer searched for and discovered an outstanding warrant himself.38 Turning
to the final factor, the court found that the “purpose and flagrancy” factor was
also ill suited for cases involving an outstanding warrant, because the factor
considers how the offending officer’s actions affected the defendant’s arrest.39 In particular, the court found that this factor was meant to evaluate
whether the officer’s conduct was “calculated to cause surprise, fright, and
confusion.”40 The court determined that whether law enforcement’s illegal
arrest causes “surprise, fright, and confusion” is irrelevant to cases involving
outstanding warrants.41 The court ultimately held that the attenuation doctrine only applies to instances involving a defendant’s “independent acts of
free will” and that the doctrine is not applicable when an officer makes an
unconstitutional stop and subsequently finds an outstanding warrant.42
The court then declared that when there are “two parallel acts of police
work—one a violation of the Fourth Amendment (detention without reasonable suspicion) and the other perfectly legal (execution of an outstanding arrest warrant),” the inevitable discovery doctrine is implicated.43 Even so, the
33. Id. at 545.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975)).
41. Id. The court found that the use of actions meant to cause “surprise, fright, and confusion”
were typically intended to illicit a confession from a defendant. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court stated further: “[T]his exception exempts from exclusion evidence that is the
but-for result of police misconduct but that also would inevitably have been produced by untainted
police work.” Id.
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court found that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, suppression would
still be necessary, as it would be impossible to determine if the Defendant
would have been in possession of the contraband “on any future date on
which he may have been arrested on the outstanding warrant.”44 The Supreme Court of Utah ultimately reversed the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, granted Mr. Strieff’s motion to suppress, and found that the attenuation doctrine was not an applicable exception to the exclusionary rule.45 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine whether
the “attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes an unconstitutional
investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid
arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest.”46
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The exclusionary rule is a tool used by the courts to protect citizens’
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.47 Specifically, the rule provides a remedy for evidence discovered through an unconstitutional search
or seizure.48 The rule’s protections, while significant, are not limitless, and
are applicable only when the benefits of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment outweigh the costs.49 Part II.A of this Note
will review the implementation of the exclusionary rule in both federal and
state courts and will explain the scope of the exclusionary rule.50 Additionally, Part II.A will examine the purpose behind the exclusionary rule.51 Part
II.B of this Note will explore the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, where
the Court has determined the costs of its implementation are too substantial.52
A. The Exclusionary Rule Forbids the Use of Evidence Obtained
Though Unconstitutional Means Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”53 In Boyd v. United States,54 the

44. Id. at 546.
45. Id.
46. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
47. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
48. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1927).
49. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See infra Part II.A.
52. See infra Part II.B.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Supreme Court created a judicial remedy for Fourth Amendment violations
with what is now known as the exclusionary rule.55 Simply put, the exclusionary rule mandates that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible in a criminal trial.56 In Weeks v. United States,57
the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment is moot without a judicial
remedy in place58 and that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are
granted to all citizens, whether they are accused of a crime or not.59
The Court expanded the protections of the exclusionary rule in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,60 holding that any evidence acquired
as a result of the assistance of illegally obtained information is also inadmissible in a criminal trial.61 The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment
requires not only that evidence acquired through unconstitutional means shall
not be used in court, “but that it shall not be used at all.”62 In Segura v. United
States,63 the Court elaborated, “the exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but
also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality[,]”
a doctrine now known as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”64 In Mapp v. Ohio,65
the Supreme Court held that these restrictions apply equally in state courts,
ruling that evidence obtained through the violation of the Fourth Amendment
is inadmissible in state and federal courts alike.66
55. Id. at 635.
56. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1927). In Byars, the Court stated:
A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings
to light; and the doctrine has never been recognized by this Court, nor can it be tolerated
under our constitutional system, that evidences of crime discovered by a federal officer
in making a search without lawful warrant may be used against the victim of the unlawful
search where a timely challenge has been interposed.
Id. (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
306 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
57. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
58. Id. at 393. In Weeks, the Court asserted:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id.
59. Id. at 392.
60. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
61. Id. at 392.
62. Id.
63. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
64. Id. at 804 (first citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); then quoting
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court initially declined to apply the exclusionary rule to the states,
assuming that each state had other means of protection, making the application to the states unnecessary. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29–31 (1949).
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The Supreme Court has viewed the exclusionary rule as a multipurpose
tool that both deters unlawful police conduct and upholds judicial integrity.67
In Elkins v. United States,68 the Supreme Court noted that the rule was meant
to “prevent, not to repair” injustices associated with the violation of Fourth
Amendment rights.69 According to the Court, the exclusionary rule’s “purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”70 The
Court has also emphasized the importance of the exclusionary rule as a limitation on courts that, when followed, upholds the protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.71 The Court stressed that the judiciary could not
allow consideration of evidence obtained through violation of the Constitution without being “accomplices in willful disobedience of law.”72 Although
the Weeks Court found that both deterrence and judicial integrity guided the
exclusionary rule,73 more recent cases have understated the judicial integrity
justification and instead emphasized the deterrence rationale.74 In United
States v. Calandra,75 for example, the Court has emphasized that the “prime
purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct.”76 In Davis v. United States,77 the Court went as far to say that the “sole
purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations”78 and emphasized that in cases “[w]here suppression fails to yield
‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly . . . unwarranted.’”79
B. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
While the Court has recognized the exclusionary rule’s “broad deterrent
purpose,” it has still noted that the rule was never meant to forbid “the use of

67. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). The Court in Wong Sun found that
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule were “deterring lawless conduct by federal officers”
and “closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.” Id.
(first citing Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); then citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960)).
68. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
69. Id. at 217.
70. Id.
71. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914).
72. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942).
73. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92.
74. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see also Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229 (2011).
75. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
76. Id. at 347.
77. 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
78. Id. at 236–37.
79. Id. at 237 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). The Court acknowledged the heavy toll associated with the application of the exclusionary rule, namely the release of
criminals without just punishment through the suppression of otherwise reliable evidence. Id.
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illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.”80 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the “substantial social costs”81 of the exclusionary rule, finding that the “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always
been our last resort, not our first impulse.”82 Consequently, the Court has
deemed the exclusionary rule to be “applicable only . . . ‘where its deterrence
benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’”83 Consistent with this consideration, the Court has laid out several specific exceptions to the exclusionary rule in circumstances where the social costs of not admitting the illegally
seized evidence outweigh the deterrence benefits.84 Pertinent here are the
independent source doctrine, inevitable discovery doctrine, good faith exception, and attenuation doctrine.
1. Independent Source Doctrine
In Nix v. Williams,85 the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he independent
source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by
means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.”86 The Court explained that the public interest in both “deterring unlawful police conduct”
and providing juries with “all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that [sic] they
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”87 The
Nix Court found that the exclusion of evidence that came from an independent source, entirely unconnected to any purported Fourth Amendment violation, “would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in
absent any error or violation.”88 Ultimately, the independent source doctrine
turns on the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule: deterrence of police
misconduct.89 In Murray v. United States,90 the Court concluded that when
evidence is “‘wholly independent of’ the constitutional violation, then exclusion arguably will have no effect on a law enforcement officer’s incentive to
commit an unlawful search,” and, therefore, the evidence should not be excluded.91

80. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 at 348.
81. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 907 (1984)).
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
84. See supra Part II.B.1–4.
85. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
86. Id. at 443.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 544–45 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
91. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).
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2. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
The inevitable discovery doctrine is similar to the independent source
doctrine, as it also seeks to prevent the government from being in a worse
position than it would have been absent the police error or misconduct.92 The
Supreme Court first adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix v. Williams.93 The Court again turned to the primary purpose of the exclusionary
rule in its holding—deterrence of police misconduct—to find that if the evidence ultimately “would have been discovered by lawful means . . . then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.”94
The Court concluded “[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably
have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial.”95 The Court ultimately held that when “the evidence in question
would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error
or misconduct,” that evidence should not be suppressed.96
3. Good Faith Exception
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was established
through two companion cases and, again, focused on the deterrence of police
misconduct.97 In United States v. Leon,98 the Court restated, the “deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right.”99 The Court then noted that because of the
deterrent purpose behind the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement
officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”100 This exception has traditionally been applied in cases where the constitutional violation

92. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443–44.
93. Id. at 440–41, 444. In Nix v. Williams, the defendant led local police to the remains of a
missing girl after making an incriminating statement that was illegally obtained. Id. at 435–36. The
Court held that the evidence would not be suppressed because the search party would have inevitably discovered the girl’s body had their search continued. Id. at 449–50.
94. Id. at 444.
95. Id. at 446.
96. Id. at 448.
97. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (finding that “[p]enalizing [an] officer
for [a] magistrate judge’s error cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment
violations”); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990–91 (1984) (noting that suppressing evidence because of a magistrate judge’s clerical errors “will not serve the deterrent function that the
exclusionary rule was designed to achieve”).
98. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
99. Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).
100. Id. (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 at 539).
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was in response to an error made by someone other than the offending officer.101 In instances where the offending officer has acted in good faith, the
Court has held, “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained . . . cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”102
4. Attenuation Doctrine
The exclusionary rule exception at issue in Utah v. Strieff was the attenuation doctrine.103 Under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible
when the connection between the discovery of the evidence and the unconstitutional misconduct has become “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of
the misconduct.104 In Wong Sun v. United States,105 the Court found that evidence is not considered “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would
not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.”106 Instead,
the Court must assess whether the evidence in question was discovered
through the exploitation of the unlawful police conduct, or instead, by “sufficiently distinguishable” means.107 In Brown v. Illinois,108 for example, the
Court evaluated whether the use of Miranda warnings was enough to dissipate the taint of a confession obtained after an illegal arrest.109 The Court
found that the police officer’s use of Miranda warnings alone could not attenuate the connection between the officer’s unconstitutional arrest of the defendant and the defendant’s subsequent confession.110 In reaching its holding, the Court proposed a three-factor test to determine whether sufficient
attenuation exists: (1) the “temporal proximity” between the unlawful police
conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence,111 (2) “the presence of
intervening circumstances,”112 and (3) “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.”113
101. See generally Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). In Arizona v. Evans, an officer pulled
over the defendant for a traffic violation, ran his name, and found an outstanding warrant for his
arrest. Id. at 4. The officer then arrested the defendant and located drugs on his person. Id. After
the arrest, it was discovered that the outstanding warrant had been quashed and was no longer valid.
Id. The Court still determined that the evidence was admissible because its suppression would not
have any significant deterrence effect. Id. at 14–15.
102. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
103. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
104. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
105. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
106. Id. at 487–88.
107. Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS
UPON ITS DISCOVERY OR COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE 221 (1959)).
108. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
109. Id. at 591–92.
110. Id. at 604–05.
111. Id. at 603 (citing United States v. Owen, 492 F2d 1100, 1107 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 965 (1974) (mem.)).
112. Id. at 604 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972)).
113. Id. (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963)).
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court offered these four separate exceptions to
the exclusionary rule to highlight the “prime purpose” of the rule: the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.114 While the Court’s precedent has valued
the protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, it has also acknowledged the balance between those protections and the need for a fair and thorough criminal justice system.115 Under these four exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the Court has found that the “substantial social costs” outweigh
any deterrence benefits.116
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of
Utah’s decision, holding that the incriminating evidence seized from Mr.
Strieff following his arrest was “admissible because the officer’s discovery
of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and
the evidence seized.”117 The Court first noted that the scope of the exclusionary rule includes “both the ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an
illegal search or seizure’” and, relevant in this case, evidence discovered using knowledge gained through an illegal search or seizure, also known as
“fruit of the poisonous tree.”118 The Court then acknowledged the significant
costs associated with the exclusionary rule, deeming it appropriate only
“where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”119 As a
result, evidence should not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule when
the causal connection between the unlawful search or seizure and the discovery of the evidence is broken by an intervening circumstance.120 The Court
specifically noted that in such a case, the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment “would not be served by [suppressing] the evidence obtained.”121
The Court first evaluated whether the attenuation doctrine applied and,
more generally, whether the doctrine is implicated in cases involving the discovery of a pre-existing arrest warrant.122 The Court rejected the Supreme
Court of Utah’s assertion that the attenuation doctrine only applies to cases
“involving an independent act of a defendant’s ‘free will’ in confessing to a

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
See supra Part II.B.
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
Id. at 2061 (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)).
Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 at 593).
Id.
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crime or consenting to a search.”123 Instead, the Court found that the attenuation doctrine more broadly examines the causal connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of the evidence at issue, a
connection that does not require an independent act of a defendant.124 Thus,
the attenuation doctrine may apply in circumstances involving the discovery
of a pre-existing warrant.125 Upon reaching this preliminary conclusion, the
Court applied the three-factor test articulated in Brown.126 The Court concluded that although the temporal proximity of the illegal stop and the search
weighed in favor of suppressing the evidence, countervailing considerations
supported the conclusion that the evidence was admissible under the attenuation doctrine.127
On the first Brown prong, the Court considered the temporal proximity
between the illegal stop and the discovery of the evidence on Mr. Strieff’s
person.128 The Strieff Court reasoned that the temporal proximity factor will
support the suppression of the evidence unless a “‘substantial time’ elapses
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”129 The Court
noted that Officer Fackrell discovered the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia only minutes after Mr. Strieff was illegally stopped, and this short
time frame favored suppressing the evidence that was discovered during the
search.130
The Court then addressed the second attenuation doctrine factor, the
“presence of intervening circumstances,” and found that Officer Fackrell’s
discovery of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance that attenuated the causal connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of the incriminating evidence.131 The Court
compared the discovery of the outstanding warrant to the facts at issue in
Segura v. United States, where agents of the state sought a warrant and, while
waiting for that warrant, illegally entered the apartment to conduct a security
sweep.132 While inside the apartment, the agents “discovered evidence of
drug activity.”133 The next day, a judge issued a search warrant for the apartment.134 The Supreme Court held that the evidence of the drug activity was

123. Id. (quoting State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 544 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah v. Strieff,
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2061–62 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)).
127. Id. at 2063.
128. Id. at 2062.
129. Id. (quoting Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 800–01 (1984)).
133. Id. (citing Segura, 468 U.S. at 800–01).
134. Id.
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admissible because the information that the agents used to obtain the legal
search warrant was known before they entered the apartment and was unconnected to the initial illegal entry.135 The Strieff majority acknowledged that
the Segura Court applied the independent source doctrine, and not the attenuation doctrine, but still found that the decision “suggested that the existence
of a valid warrant favors finding that the connection between unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence is ‘sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the
taint.’”136 The Court reasoned that Mr. Strieff’s warrant was issued prior to
Officer Fackrell’s investigation, and thus, the issuance was unrelated to this
investigation.137 Additionally, the Court noted that “once Officer Fackrell
discovered the warrant, he had an obligation to arrest Strieff.”138 The Court
found that following Mr. Strieff’s arrest, it was completely lawful for Officer
Fackrell to search Mr. Strieff as a means of protecting the officer’s safety.139
The Court then turned to the final factor, which considers “the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct.”140 The Court noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and that police
misconduct involving purposeful or flagrant actions is when deterrence is
most needed.141 The Court determined that Officer Fackrell’s actions were
negligent at most and not purposeful or flagrant, finding that he only made
two good-faith mistakes.142 First, Officer Fackrell did not see Mr. Strieff
enter the “suspected drug house,” only exit it.143 Therefore, Officer Fackrell
lacked a sufficient basis to conclude that Mr. Strieff was a “short-term visitor” there to complete a drug transaction.144 Second, because there was insufficient information to suggest that Mr. Strieff was a “short-term visitor,”
Officer Fackrell should have only requested to speak with Mr. Strieff instead
of demanding it,145 as he was simply trying to investigate what was happening
inside the house.146 Despite the faults in Officer Fackrell’s conduct, the Court
determined that these faults did not amount to “a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”147 The Court found that
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“[w]hile Officer Fackrell’s decision to initiate the stop was mistaken, his conduct thereafter was lawful.”148 Additionally, the majority found that there
was “no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct” and instead found that it was “an isolated instance of
negligence.”149 After applying all three factors, the Court held that the evidence Officer Fackrell found on Mr. Strieff’s person was admissible, because
the discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unconstitutional stop and the incriminating evidence.150 The Court found that
although the temporal proximity factor weighed in favor of suppression, it
was offset by the other two factors.151 Ultimately, the Court held that the
discovery of the pre-existing arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance
and that there was “no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.”152
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority’s
holding, which she characterized as permitting “the discovery of a warrant
for an unpaid parking ticket [to] forgive a police officer’s violation of [a person’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”153 Justice Sotomayor reasoned that admitting this evidence “would tell officers that unlawfully discovering even a
‘small traffic warrant’ would give them license to search for evidence of unrelated offenses.”154 Justice Sotomayor noted that an officer breaches the
protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment when he detains a citizen to run a warrant check without reasonable suspicion155 and then “deepens
the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish further for evidence of
wrongdoing.”156 She rejected the argument that the officer’s actions should
have been forgiven simply because his instincts were correct,157 noting
“[w]hen ‘lawless police conduct’ uncovers evidence of lawless civilian conduct,”158 the Supreme Court has mandated that criminal courts suppress the
unlawfully obtained evidence.159
Justice Sotomayor then explored the policy issues that could arise from
this decision arguing that the exclusionary rule “removes [the] incentive for
officers to search us without proper justification.”160 She also acknowledged

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2065.
Id.
Id. (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1969)).
Id.
Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 12).

2017]

UTAH v. STRIEFF

129

the other well-known purpose of the rule: to uphold judicial integrity and to
keep the courts from sanctioning a police officer’s encroachment on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.161 Justice Sotomayor noted that by admitting unlawfully obtained evidence, courts are rewarding a police officer’s
“manifest neglect if not open defiance” of the protections of the Constitution.162
Justice Sotomayor went on to apply the factors articulated in Brown v.
Illinois, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that when looked at in totality,
the factors weigh in favor of the State and the admission of the evidence.163
Justice Sotomayor agreed that the temporal proximity factor weighed in favor
of Mr. Strieff, as Officer Fackrell stopped Mr. Strieff “and immediately ran
a warrant check.”164 Still, she argued that the “discovery of a warrant was
not some intervening surprise that [Officer Fackrell] could not have anticipated” as there is an exceedingly large “backlog of outstanding warrants” in
Salt Lake County, Utah.165 Justice Sotomayor also asserted that Officer
Fackrell stopped Mr. Strieff for the sole purpose of procuring evidence, describing Officer Fackrell’s stop as an “expedition for evidence in the hope
that something might turn up.”166 Ultimately Justice Sotomayor concluded
that the drugs should have been excluded as Officer Fackrell found them “by
exploiting his own constitutional violation,”167 she reasoned, “[t]he officer
found the drugs only after learning of Strieff’s traffic violation; and he
learned of Strieff’s traffic violation only because he unlawfully stopped
Strieff to check his driver’s license.”168
Justice Kagan also wrote a dissenting opinion, recognizing that “[t]he
exclusionary rule serves a crucial function—to deter unconstitutional police
conduct” but acknowledged that the “suppression of evidence also ‘exacts a
heavy toll,’” with consequences including the “release of criminals without
just punishment.”169 Subsequently, Justice Kagan reasoned that there must
be “sound balance between those two competing considerations,” applying
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the exclusionary rule only when the suppression of evidence will lead to substantial deterrence of unlawful state action.170 In balancing these two considerations, Justice Kagan turned to the three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois.171 While Justice Kagan agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the
temporal proximity factor weighed in favor of Mr. Strieff, she differed from
the majority’s finding that Officer Fackrell’s actions were not purposeful or
flagrant.172 Justice Kagan instead stated that “the seizure of Strieff was a
calculated decision, taken with so little justification that the State has never
tried to defend its legality.”173 Finally, Justice Kagan, in evaluating the “intervening circumstance” factor, found that in order for an occurrence to be
intervening, it must be unforeseeable.174 Justice Kagan made clear that Officer Fackrell’s discovery of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding warrant could not be
intervening because checking for outstanding warrants is part of Salt Lake
City’s normal detention procedure, and these checks often result in the discovery of arrest warrants.175 Ultimately, Justice Kagan found that all three
Brown factors required the suppression of the evidence.176 In closing, she
argued that the majority’s misapplication of the test, in fact, incentivizes an
officer to violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution by stopping an
individual without reasonable suspicion, as the stop could yield admissible
evidence.177
IV. ANALYSIS
In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court evaluated “whether the prohibition
on admitting evidence [obtained through an illegal stop] dissolves if the officer discovers, after making the stop but before finding the [evidence], that
the person has an outstanding arrest warrant.”178 The Court ultimately held
that the evidence “seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible
because the officer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest.”179
In coming to this conclusion, the Court applied the three-factor test for the
attenuation doctrine articulated in Brown v. Illinois.180 The Court’s reasoning
in this case is flawed, as it misinterpreted the “intervening circumstances”
170. Id. (first citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 238; then citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
141 (2009)).
171. Id. at 2071–72.
172. Id. at 2072.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2073.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2072.
177. Id. at 2073–74.
178. Id. at 2071.
179. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 2061–62.
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factor from Brown181 by equating it to the independent source doctrine182 and
ignored the requirement of unforeseeability.183 Furthermore, the Court erred
in concluding that Officer Fackrell’s conduct was merely “negligent,” and,
in doing so, disregarded the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule: deterrence of “unlawful police conduct.”184 The Court’s holding in Strieff has significantly broadened the scope of the attenuation doctrine, which has the effect of narrowing the application of the exclusionary rule and the protections
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Court Incorrectly Applied the “Intervening Circumstances”
Factor
In reaching its holding, the Strieff Court strongly relied on the second
factor articulated in Brown v. Illinois: “the presence of intervening circumstances.”185 The Court determined that this factor weighed heavily in favor
of the state, and the discovery of a pre-existing warrant is an intervening circumstance that attenuates the causal relationship between the illegal stop and
the evidence found.186 In reaching this conclusion, the Court compared the
facts relevant to the “intervening circumstances” analysis in Mr. Strieff’s
case to the facts in Segura v. United States, a case where the Court applied a
different exception to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine.187 The Court found that the pre-existence of Mr. Strieff’s warrant compelled Officer Fackrell to arrest him, an event unrelated to the initial illegal
stop.188 The Court’s analysis of the “intervening circumstances” factor in
Strieff was flawed because it disregarded the true intention of the attenuation
doctrine189 and incorrectly compared the intervening circumstances factor to
the independent source doctrine.190
1.

The Court Ignored the Correct Meaning of “Intervening
Circumstance”

The Strieff majority plainly stated that the discovery of an outstanding
warrant was enough to meet the threshold of what constitutes an “intervening
circumstance.”191 In reaching this decision, however, the Court ignored the

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see infra Part IV.B.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062–63.
Id. at 2062 (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984)).
Id. at 2062–63.
Id.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.

132

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 76:115

primary inquiry under the attenuation doctrine: whether the evidence at issue
has been discovered through the “exploitation of [an] illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”192 The
Court’s application of the attenuation doctrine—and more specifically, the
“intervening circumstance” factor—has strayed so far from this primary inquiry that it no longer serves the intended purpose of the exclusionary rule
“to deter future unlawful police conduct.”193
The Court’s divergence from the original meaning of “intervening circumstances” becomes clear when analyzing the Strieff holding in light of the
Court’s precedent. Although the attenuation cases that followed Brown did
not apply the three-factor test that Brown initially proposed,194 the Court’s
application of the “intervening circumstances” factor can still be critiqued by
looking at the case from which the three factors were derived: Wong Sun v.
United States.195 In Wong Sun, the Court first assessed the facts surrounding
the arrest of the defendant, James Wah Toy, who gave a statement to the
police following his illegal arrest that led the police to a second target, Johnny
Yee.196 Upon Yee’s arrest, the police found heroine at his place of residence;
however, the Court noted that “Toy’s illegal arrest led directly to his statements implicating Yee, which led directly to the discovery of the drugs.”197
The Court rejected the State’s notion that Toy’s statement was an intervening
circumstance,198 and instead held that the narcotics must be suppressed because they “were ‘come at by the exploitation of [the police’s] illegality.’”199
The Court then turned its attention to another defendant, Wong Sun,
who was illegally arrested in his home after Yee and Toy made statements
implicating him.200 After Wong Sun’s arrest and arraignment, he was released on his own recognizance and then voluntarily returned to the police
station several days later to give a statement.201 Although the Court was unable to determine what events transpired between Wong Sun’s release and
subsequent return to the police station, it still held that the statement was admissible, as “the connection between the [illegal] arrest and the statement had

192. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting MAGUIRE, supra note 107,
at 221).
193. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
194. Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule is Weakened but it Still Lives,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysisthe-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/#more-244171.
195. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
196. Id. at 474–75.
197. RIC SIMMONS & RENÉE MCDONALD HUTCHINS, LEARNING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 651
(2014) (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
198. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487.
199. Id. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, supra note 107, at 221).
200. Id. at 475.
201. Id. at 475–76.
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‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’”202 These two examples illustrate the error committed by the Strieff majority in applying the “intervening circumstances” factor. As in the first example in Wong Sun, where the
illegal conduct of the officer led directly to the discovery of the heroine,203
Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop of Mr. Strieff led directly to his discovery of
the outstanding warrant, which led, in turn, directly to the discovery of the
drugs.204 Although Wong Sun demonstrated that an intervening circumstance
does not always need to be palpable, the Court here inserted an intervening
circumstance where none existed.
The Strieff majority, however, ignored the fact that the warrant would
not have been discovered if not for Officer Fackrell’s illegal actions and
claimed that the mere existence of the outstanding warrant was enough to
constitute an intervening circumstance.205 This logical jump discounts the
key detail that Officer Fackrell “discovered Strieff’s drugs by exploiting his
own illegal conduct,”206 the exact type of transgression that the exclusionary
rule is designed to prevent.207 The Court’s focus “on the existence of the
warrant prior to the stop . . . seemed somewhat to obscure the fact that the
discovery of the warrant . . . seemed to follow quite naturally from the deliberate actions of the officer[,]”208 an obscurity that allows an officer to create
his own intervening circumstance.
Additionally, as Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent, a circumstance
is considered intervening only if it is unforeseeable.209 In this case, Officer
Fackrell made the illegal stop and then immediately called a police dispatcher
to run a warrant check.210 The subsequent discovery of the warrant “was not
some intervening surprise that [Officer Fackrell] could not have anticipated.”211 Instead, it was a result of the normal procedure that police officers
in South Salt Lake City follow.212 Given Utah’s exceptional number of outstanding warrants, Officer Fackrell’s discovery of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding

202. Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
203. SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 197, at 651.
204. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2067.
206. Id. at 2066.
207. Id. at 2071 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
208. Sherry F. Colb, A Potential Landmine in Waiting in Utah v. Strieff, VERDICT (June 28,
2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/06/28/potential-landmine-waiting-utah-v-strieff.
209. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2072–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The concept of an intervening circumstance “comes from the tort law doctrine of proximate causation” and “in the tort context, a
circumstance counts as intervening only when it is unforeseeable—not when it can be seen coming
from miles away.” Id.
210. Id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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warrant was not an unforeseeable occurrence that should be deemed an intervening circumstance.213 As Justice Kagan articulated in her dissent, “rather
than breaking the causal chain, predictable effects . . . are its very links.”214
Officer Fackrell knew or should have known that the warrant check he was
about to run could conceivably result in the discovery of an outstanding warrant for Mr. Strieff’s arrest—knowledge that eliminates the possibility of this
action yielding unforeseeable results.215 Ultimately, the Strieff majority set a
precedent that is in conflict with the purpose behind the exclusionary rule—
the deterrence of unlawful police conduct216—and broadened the attenuation
doctrine to encompass more than was ever originally intended.
2. The Court Incorrectly Equated the “Intervening Circumstances”
Factor with the Independent Source Doctrine
While evaluating the “intervening circumstances” factor, the Court
heavily relied on a comparison of the facts at issue to the facts that the Court
evaluated in Segura v. United States.217 The Strieff majority acknowledged
that the Segura Court applied the independent source doctrine and not the
attenuation doctrine, but still deemed the comparison appropriate in the evaluation of the “intervening circumstances” factor, as the facts were “similar.”218 In Segura, state officials applied for a warrant to search a suspect’s
apartment.219 While the warrant application was pending, the state officials
entered the apartment and conducted a security sweep.220 After the warrant
was granted, the agents then did another sweep of the apartment and collected
evidence.221 Although the Court agreed that the initial entry and security
sweep of the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, it found that suppression of the evidence obtained during the search warrant’s execution was
not necessary because “there was an independent source for the warrant under which that evidence was seized.”222 The Strieff majority interpreted this
language to mean that the mere existence of an outstanding warrant is enough
to justify the admission of evidence seized as a direct result of an illegal
stop.223
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As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent, the majority’s interpretation of the Segura holding has no application in cases like Strieff.224 The
Segura Court came to its holding by relying on the fact that the agents did
not use the information that they illegally procured in order to obtain the
search warrant.225 The Court emphasized that the search warrant was requested prior to the agents’ illegal entry into the apartment and was granted
on grounds that were known to the agents before that entry occurred.226 For
that reason, the Court held that the evidence discovered was admissible because the warrant was procured through an independent source.227 The Segura Court’s reasoning makes it clear that its holding has no bearing on the
Strieff case, as Officer Fackrell only found the drugs on Mr. Strieff’s person
after discovering Mr. Strieff had an outstanding warrant, and Officer Fackrell
only discovered that Mr. Strieff had an outstanding warrant because he illegally stopped him on the street and ran a warrant check, a clear exploitation
of Officer Fackrell’s own illegal conduct.228 As Justice Sotomayor indicated,
the facts of “Segura would be similar only if the agents used information they
illegally obtained from the apartment to procure a search warrant.”229 Instead, in Segura, there was a very clear separation between the information
obtained through the illegality and the procurement of the search warrant,230
a separation that is not seen when the warrant is only discovered through the
unlawful conduct of a police officer.
The comparison of Segura to Strieff, while erroneous, also appears to
ignore the objective of the independent source doctrine as articulated in Nix
v. Williams, which balances:
[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and
the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence
of a crime . . . by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that [sic] they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.231
The majority in Strieff, instead, used the independent source doctrine as
a means to place the police in a better—not the same—position than they
would have been in had the illegal stop not occurred. Although, the police
would have been able to arrest Mr. Strieff at any other time upon the legal
discovery of his outstanding warrant, as the Supreme Court of Utah pointed
out, it would be impossible to determine if he would have been in possession
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of the contraband “on any future date on which he may have been arrested
on the outstanding warrant.”232 The Court not only interjected the independent source doctrine where it does not belong, but it also ignored the doctrine’s
purpose by using it to give an advantage to the State when it clearly calls for
an equal playing field.233
B. The Court Incorrectly Applied the “Purpose and Flagrancy”
Factor
In reaching its holding, the Court also found that the “purpose and flagrancy” factor weighed strongly in favor of the State on the grounds that Officer Fackrell’s actions did not rise to a level in need of deterrence.234 Specifically, the Court concluded that “Officer Fackrell made two good-faith
mistakes” in his detention of Mr. Strieff and found that Officer Fackrell was
negligent at most.235 In categorizing Officer Fackrell’s actions as “good-faith
mistakes,” the Court has turned the analysis of this factor into one akin to the
good faith doctrine.236 Under the good faith doctrine, however, an officer’s
mistake is forgiven only if the officer “did not willfully violate the Fourth
Amendment.”237 In applying the good faith doctrine, the Court has acknowledged that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct,”238 and determined that its prime purpose was not promoted through
the suppression of evidence that was discovered through an officer’s good
faith mistake.239 In this case, however, Officer Fackrell’s actions were not in
“good faith” as the majority seems to believe, and even when accepting the
majority’s opinion that Officer Fackrell’s actions were merely negligent, this
“negligent” behavior is still susceptible to deterrence.240 As Justice Sotomayor stated in her dissent, “the Fourth Amendment does not tolerate an
officer’s unreasonable searches and seizures just because he did not know
any better[,]”241 and “officers prone to negligence” can still be deterred from
conducting unconstitutional stops and seizures in the future through the precedent set in court.242
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The Court not only erroneously concluded that negligent actions could
not be deterred, but also erred in deeming his actions only negligent.243 Instead, Officer Fackrell’s seizure of Mr. Strieff “was a calculated decision,
taken with so little justification that the State has never tried to defend its
legality.”244 Officer Fackrell stated that he stopped Mr. Strieff to ascertain
what was going on in the house, but openly admitted that he had no basis for
his actions aside from seeing Mr. Strieff leave the suspected drug house.245
The Court asserted that Officer Fackrell’s “decision to run the warrant check
was a ‘negligibly burdensome precautio[n]’ for officer safety.”246 But Officer Fackrell, by his own account, did not fear Mr. Strieff.247 Instead, Officer
Fackrell’s actions were a deliberate attempt to discover criminal wrongdoing
where Officer Fackrell would have otherwise hit a dead end.248 Although the
majority stated that Officer Fackrell’s actions did not constitute a “fishing
expedition,”249 these are the exact kind of actions that the Court has previously held unconstitutional because they were conducted “in the hope that
something would turn up.”250 Officer Fackrell’s conduct was so flagrant—
such a constitutional misstep—that the Court’s decision to deem it negligent
was a complete blunder in light of its own precedent.251
In the Court’s misapplication of the purpose and flagrancy factor, it
seemed to ignore the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule, “to deter unlawful police conduct.”252 Justice Powell once explained that the attenuation
doctrine “attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences
of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.”253 In this case, the Court has
broadened the attenuation doctrine to a point where it will not only fail to
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deter unlawful police conduct, it will incentivize it.254 Justice Kagan, in her
dissent, adeptly articulated this point. Justice Kagan noted that, in the past,
an officer would be deterred from stopping someone without cause for investigative reasons, as this stop would likely yield evidence that would be
deemed inadmissible in court.255 The majority’s holding, however, ignores
the intended deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule and instead relays that
an illegal “stop may well yield admissible evidence: So long as the target is
one of the many millions of people in this country with an outstanding arrest
warrant . . . .”256 This new precedent set by the Strieff majority will allow
officers to retroactively claim grounds for making an unconstitutional stop,
eliminating the deterrent purpose of the rule all together.257
V. CONCLUSION
In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court held that the evidence “seized as a
part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the officer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful
stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest.”258 Ultimately, this judgment
was flawed, as the Court erroneously equated the “intervening circumstances” factor to the independent source doctrine,259 and ignored the requirement of unforeseeability, a condition that is not met by the facts of Strieff.260
Furthermore, the Court incorrectly held that the officer’s actions were merely
negligent, and not “purposeful and flagrant.”261 The Court’s inconsistent
analysis has deemed the purpose of the exclusionary rule—the deterrence of
police misconduct—moot, while simultaneously narrowing the protections
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.262
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